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Abstract
We study the implications of assuming different energy intensities for
physical capital accumulation and final good production in an overlapping
generations (OLG) resource economy. Differing from the standard OLG
literature, but consistently with the empirical evidence, physical capital
accumulation is assumed to be relatively more energy-intensive than con-
sumption. Focusing on exhaustible resources, we find that OLG equilibria
can exhibit a “non-classical behaviour”: our model can generate complex
dynamics where extraction may increase during some periods and decrease
afterwards. As a consequence, in contrast to the classical response predicted
by the standard approach, resource prices may not increase monotonically.
This result points out the importance of the assumptions about energy-
intensity considered in the literature.
∗Corresponding author at: INRA-UMR210 E´conomie Publique, Avenue Lucien Bre´tignie`res,
78850 Thiverval Grignon, France; e-mail: agperez@grignon.inra.fr.
Keywords: natural resources; energy prices; overlapping generations.
Journal of Economic Literature: Q31; Q43; O44.
2
1 Introduction
How does the scarcity of natural resources limit economic growth and to what
extent physical capital accumulation offsets this constraint? These questions have
been the research focus of many papers in the literature of resource economics dat-
ing back to Dasgupta and Heal (1974, 1979), Solow (1974), and Stiglitz (1974). In
these studies, resources are assumed to be extracted in order to provide energy that
will be used in the final good production. The limit to economic growth is then
directly imposed by the usage of scarce resources in production. Greater physical
capital accumulation is suggested (unless non-renewable resources are substituted
with renewables) to overcome this constraint. However, the overwhelming ma-
jority of the literature, assuming the same technology for both consumption and
physical capital accumulation, tends to contradict the empirical evidence about
the energy intensity of these sectors. Data suggests that physical capital produc-
tion is relatively more energy intensive than consumption, so that non-renewable
resources could limit growth through the equipment production sector.1 In this
paper we analyze the effect of differentiating the energy intensities of physical cap-
ital and final good production in an overlapping generations (OLG) exhaustible
resource economy. We study how the standard results regarding the dynamics of
resources and prices are modified if physical capital accumulation is assumed to
be relatively more energy-intensive than consumption.
To our knowledge, differing energy intensities has only been studied in Pe´rez-
Barahona (2011), considering an infinitely lived agents general equilibrium model.
1Azomahou et al. (2004 and 2006) builds an energy intensity measurement (ratio between
energy consumption and value added) of 14 sectors of the economy from the Structural Analysis
Database of OECD and the Energy Balances and Energy Prices and Taxes of IEA. Their empirical
analysis shows that energy intensity is high in sectors closely involved in production of physical
capital (e.g., iron and steel sector, 0.809; transport and storage, 0.85; non-ferrous metals, 0.599;
and non-metallic minerals, 0.507). However, energy intensity is lower for consumption goods
related sectors (e.g., food and tobacco, 0.134; textile and leather, 0.082; and construction, 0.018).
In the same direction, Williams (2004) points out that the “life cycle energy use of a computer
is dominated by production (81%) as opposed to operation (19%)”.
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This paper shows that the monotonicity properties of consumption and resource
extraction change if physical capital accumulation is assumed to be relatively more
energy-intensive than consumption. The study is limited however to infinitely
lived agents models, while numerous papers claim that the OLG framework offers
a better explanatory power for the discussion of natural resource problems.2 As in
Pe´rez-Barahona (2011), we assume that the physical capital sector is more energy
intensive than consumption, and energy is obtained from the extraction of natural
resources. Thus, going beyond the standard literature, in our paper the accumu-
lation of physical capital is assumed to be determined not only by the savings but
also by the energy that it requires. In addition, instead of taking resources as the
only way of saving (Krautkraemer and Batina, 1999; Koskela et al., 2002), both
resource stock and man-made capital are considered to be alternative assets (Mour-
mouras, 1991; Farmer, 2000; Agnani et al., 2005; Bednar-Friedl and Farmer, 2013).
In the literature of natural resources and OLG models, the equilibrium trajecto-
ries converge to a single steady-state (or single balanced growth path) with saddle-
path dynamics under linear/no regeneration of resources and with exogenous/no
technological progress. The standard results on growth and dynamics in OLG
exhaustible resource economies are mainly built upon the studies of Mourmouras
(1991), and Olson and Knapp (1997). It is shown that with exhaustible resources,
no technical progress, and standard assumptions about preferences and technol-
ogy, extraction trajectories monotonically decrease (and therefore, resources price
monotonically increases) into the trivial steady-state in the limit. Olson and
Knapp (1997) find however that under non-standard assumptions (finite horizon
quadratic utility), the convergence to the zero steady-state does not need to be
monotone. Extraction could transitory rise, with the corresponding decrease of
2Three main reasons are frequently quoted. First, resources are a store of value between
generations (see Koskela et al., 2002; Valente, 2008; Bednar-Friedl and Farmer; 2013). Second,
intergenerational aspects should be taken into account when analyzing environmental issues
and/or natural resource economies (Solow, 1974; Padilla, 2002; and Agnani et al., 2005). Finally,
there exists empirical evidence showing that agents are not perfect altruistically linked (among
others, Altonji et al., 1992; and Balestra, 2003).
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resources price. Moreover, cycle extraction is shown to be numerically possible
under infinite horizon, CES preferences, and for a very particular set of param-
eters. Mourmouras (1991) studies the interaction between capital accumulation
and natural resources exploitation under linear/no regeneration of resources. Be-
sides from how physical capital accumulates, this model is similar to ours but the
equilibrium dynamics are saddle-path stable.3 Differing from this approach, our
paper contributes to the literature by showing that, without taking linearizing
assumptions, our model can generate complex dynamics and the subsequent non-
monotonic behaviour of resources extraction and prices.
In absence of technological progress, we fully characterized the global dynamic
response of our economy with respect to the share of exhaustible resources in the
production of physical capital. The main contribution of our work comes from
this characterization. In contrast to Mourmouras (1991), local indeterminacy and
hopf bifurcations can arise if the share of energy resources in the equipment pro-
duction is low enough. Moreover, a non-monotonic behavior of extraction is pos-
sible: the stock of (exhaustible) resources always decreases, yet extraction may
increase during some periods and decrease afterwards. As a consequence, in con-
trast to the “classical behavior” predicted by the standard approach building on
Hotelling’s (1931) seminal work, resource prices may not increase in the short-run.
Non-renewable resources literature widely discussed the discrepancy between the
famous Hotelling prediction and the empirical evidence on resource prices. In fact,
the prediction of monotonically rising prices has not been consistent with the em-
pirical dynamic behavior of non-renewable resource prices and their in situ values.4
Investigation of mineral commodity prices shows relative declines and fluctuation
around time trends, rather than persistent increases, for long periods of time (see
figures 1-11 in Krautkraemer, 1998). Considering a large data set of U.S. min-
eral prices, Barnett and Morse (1963) were the first to systematically identify this
pattern. Slade (1982) further reveals that a U-shaped price evolution is consis-
3For a detailed analysis of the dynamics in Mourmouras (1991) see Farmer and Friedl (2010).
4See Krautkramer (1998) for a discussion of this literature.
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tent with the observed prices of many non-renewable resources over the period
1870-1978 (for a recent study, see Ferraro and Peretto, 2003). Several modifica-
tions of Hotelling’s model were then introduced in order to explain the behavior of
prices over time. Environmental constraints and the natural resource abundance
(Ahrens and Sharma, 1997), backstop technologies (Heal, 1976), technical change
(Slade, 1982) and informational asymmetries (Pindyck, 1980) are possible known
channels for inducing resources price decrease. In this regard, our paper identifies
an additional channel for this “non-classical response” of prices, which is based on
the energy intensity characteristics of the economy. We provide at the same time
a justification for the emergence of hopf cycles and indeterminacy, i.e., multiple
equilibria. The interaction between energy intensity, discount rate and the share
of physical capital in the final good production induces cyclic behavior in the econ-
omy via hopf bifurcations. Hopf bifurcations are economically important as they
provide a powerful and easy tool to detect limit cycles and justify the emergence
of cycles endogenously (for further details, see Benhabib and Farmer, 1999; Kind,
1999).5
Finally, another important feature of the paper is that our results do not rely
on particular parameterizations of the exogenous functions involved in the model.
It rather provides a flexible set-up to study the role played by the energy inten-
sity, keeping the model tractable, together with general and plausible qualitative
properties. The results are in fact analytical, and the dynamics are fully charac-
terized. The paper proceeds as follows. The model is presented in Section 1. The
competitive equilibrium is defined in Section 2. Section 3 presents the equilibrium
dynamics and examines the stability of the long-run response. Conclusions and
broader theoretical implications are discussed in Section 4.
5Hopf cycles appear when a fixed point loses or gains stability due to a change in a parameter
and meanwhile a cycle either emerges from or collapses into the fixed point (Asea and Zak,
1999). Depending on the stability of the cycles a stylized business cycle (attracting/stable cycle)
or corridor stability (repelling/unstable cycle) can appear (Kind, 1999; Benhabib and Miyao,
1981).
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2 The model
We study a perfect foresight overlapping generations economy, without population
growth, in discrete time with infinite horizon. In contrast to the standard OLG
approach, our model differentiates the energy intensity of the physical capital sec-
tor and the corresponding of the final good production.6 There are three sectors in
the economy: final good production, equipment (investment) good production and
extraction sector. A single final good, which can be either consumed or invested,
is produced in the economy by combining physical capital and labor. The physical
capital that is used in this production process is provided by the equipment sector.
The physical capital is obtained by means of the already installed equipment and
the energy supplied by the extraction sector. Finally, the extraction sector gets the
energy directly from the natural resource extracted. All agents have rational ex-
pectations and each generation consists of a single representative agent. Moreover,
they are price-takers and all the markets are assumed to be competitive.
2.1 Extraction sector
The purpose of natural resources in the model is double. They are both a store of
value, as an asset, and an input in the production of investment good as energy.
Following Agnani et al. (2005), we assume a grandfathering economy (due to
the ownership of natural resources) so that the initially old generation possesses
the stock of natural resources. At the beginning of each period t, the old agents
own the resource stock Et = etNt, where et is the amount of resources per-worker
and Nt is the number of workers. They choose how much to extract from the
resource stock in order to sell it as energy to the equipment good sector, Xt. The
remaining part of the natural resource is sold to the young agents as resource
assets, At(= Et − Xt). From period t to t + 1, the resource stock regenerates at
a linear rate Π (Mourmouras, 1991), where Π > 1.7 The transition dynamics of
6For the discussion of standard OLG models see de la Croix and Michel (2004).
7Note that the resource is non-renewable as long as Π = 1.
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energy resources in per-worker terms can be formalized as follows:
et+1 = Π(et − xt) = Πat, (1)
where xt ≡ Xt/Nt and at ≡ At/Nt.
2.2 Consumers
The representative individual receives an income equal to the real wage wt from
supplying her one unit of labor to the firms when young. She allocates her income
among current consumption, ct, savings related to investment, st, and the purchase
of natural resource ownership rights, at. In her last period of life (when old at
period t+ 1), the agent is retired and consumes dt+1 out of her entire income, not
leaving any bequests. Her income is then generated from the return on her savings
made when young, Rt+1st , from extracting the demanded portion of the energy
resources and selling it to the firms, Qt+1xt+1, and from selling the rest to the
young, Pt+1at+1, where Rt is the interest rate, and Qt and Pt are the corresponding
prices. Accordingly, the budget constraints facing generation t is as follows:
ct + st + Ptat = wt , (2)
dt+1 = Rt+1st +Qt+1xt+1 + Pt+1at+1. (3)
Generations derive utility from consumption, where their two-period intertemporal
utility function dependens on the level of consumption when young ct and when old
dt+1. We assume an additively separable life-cycle utility function U (ct, dt+1) =
u (ct) + βu (dt+1) , where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. In particu-
lar, we adopt a logarithmic instantaneous utility function u since we are mainly
concerned with the existence of the competitive equilibrium and its qualitative
properties.
Taking the prices of the energy resource and wages as given, the representative
agent born at time t maximizes her utility by choosing young and old periods’
consumption, and the ownership rights of the energy resource. The corresponding
6
optimization problem of the representative consumer is formalized as follows:
max
{ct,dt+1,st,et+1}
ln ct + β ln dt+1
subject to
ct + st + Ptat = wt ,
dt+1 = Rt+1st +Qt+1xt+1 + Pt+1at+1,
et+1 = Π(et − xt) = at
ct ≥ 0, dt+1 ≥ 0, et+1 ≥ 0, E0 > 0 given.
We get the following first-order conditions:
dt+1
ct
= βRt+1, (4)
Pt+1
Pt
=
Rt+1
Π
, (5)
Pt+1 = Qt+1. (6)
Equation (4) gives the equalization of discounted marginal utilities, where the
marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption is equal to
their relative prices. Equation (5) is the non-arbitrage condition between the differ-
ent types of savings (savings related to investment and ownership rights). Finally
equation (6) is a non-arbitrage condition, which implies that in the equilibrium
the asset price and the extracted energy price are the same. This last result is
indeed consistent with Olson and Knapp (1997) and Valente (2008). Moreover,
notice that equations (5) and (6) are equivalent to the Hotelling rule presented in
Mourmouras (1991).
2.3 Firms
2.3.1 Final good sector
Firms operating in the final good sector are owned by the old households. Firms
produce the final good with a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale technology.
Equation (7) presents this production function at any date t. The exogenous
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disembodied total factor productivity is represented by Zt (equation 8). With
constant returns to scale, the number of firms does not matter and the production
is independent of the number of firms that use the same technology. We are
so concerned with the problem of a representative firm. Under this perfectly
competitive environment, at each period t, taking the prices of inputs, the initial
technology level, and the initial level of capital stock as given, the representative
firm maximizes its profit by choosing the amount of labor and physical capital
(equipment) inputs:
max
{Kt,Nt}∞t=0
pit = Yt − PKt Kt − wtNt,
s.t. Yt = ZtK
α
t N
1−α
t 0 < α < 1, (7)
Zt+1 = (1 + z)Zt z ≥ 0. (8)
At an interior solution of the firm’s optimization problem, where all variables
are expressed in per-worker terms (kt ≡ Kt/Nt), the following first-order conditions
are satisfied equating the price of the inputs to their marginal benefits:
αyt = P
K
t kt, (9)
(1− α)yt = wt. (10)
Equation (11) summarizes the market clearing condition of the economy. The
final good is either consumed by young agents, Ct, by old agents (generation t−1),
Dt, or invested for the production of the future capital stock, St:
Yt = Ct +Dt + St. (11)
2.3.2 Physical capital sector
In the standard OLG literature, the new capital stock at time t + 1 is fully de-
termined by the savings made at time t, which are equal to the investments.
However, following Pe´rez-Barahona (2011), since the physical capital production
is relatively more energy-intensive than consumption we model the accumulation
of capital stock to be determined not only by the savings made at time t, but also
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by the energy that it requires.8 The usage of natural resource introduces then
a new constraint on economic growth through the capital accumulation sector.
In equation (12) the new capital at t + 1, Kt+1, is produced from the natural
energy resources Xt+1 and the investment made at time t, It , with the following
Cobb-Douglas technology:
Kt+1 = B
θ
t+1X
θ
t+1I
1−θ
t 0 < θ < 1, (12)
St = It, (13)
Bt˙+1 = (1 + b)Bt, b ≥ 0. (14)
It is worthwhile to mention that the savings St are still equal to the invest-
ments (equation 13). However, only a fraction of the investments can generate the
new capital stock. Bt is the technological progress in the equipment good sector.
In contrast to Zt, Bt is energy-saving and specific to the accumulation of physical
capital. If Bt increases, the productivity of the natural resources in the production
of equipment rises. Consequently, a lower amount of energy would be necessary to
produce the same amount of new physical capital. Changes in Bt also represent
investment-specific technological change, which is assumed to affect exclusively the
equipment sector.
In the equipment sector, at each period t, the representative firm maximizes
its profit by choosing the amount of energy resources that will be used in the
production process:
max
{Xt}∞t=0
pit = P
K
t Kt −QtXt,
s.t. Kt = B
θ
tX
θ
t I
1−θ
t−1 ,
taking as given the prices of capital (PKt ) and resource input (Qt), and the initial
level of capital stock. At an interior solution of the equipment firm’s optimization
8We should observe that in our economy energy is not a direct input to produce the final
good. As in Pe´rez-Barahona (2011), this simplification is considered in order to highlight the
importance of the energy intensity differences between consumption and equipment sectors.
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problem the following first-order condition is satisfied:
Qt = θαYtX
−1
t . (15)
The profit of investing in capital RtSt−1 at time t should be equal to the profit
of producing new capital (1 − θ)PKt Kt to prevent arbitrage opportunities.9 We
then obtain the following condition:
Rt = (1− θ)PKt B
θ
1−θ
t X
θ
1−θ
t K
θ
θ−1
t . (16)
2.4 The competitive equilibrium
The dynamic competitive equilibrium for this OLG natural resource economy
is defined as a sequence of prices
{
wt, Rt, P
K
t , Pt, Qt
}∞
t=0
and feasible allocations
{ct, dt, st, et, at, xt, it, yt, kt+1}∞t=0, given the positive initial values for S−1, E0, Z0,
B0, N0, and the law of motion of exogenous technological progresses Zt and Bt,
such that the consumers maximize their life-time utility, firms maximize their prof-
its, and all markets clear at every period t. This equilibrium is therefore a solution
of the system of equations (1)-(16).
3 Equilibrium dynamics
The main focus of our paper is to study the dynamics around a steady-state
equilibrium. We therefore assume no technological progress, i.e., b = z = 0. As
in Mourmouras (1991), Farmer (2000) and Bednar-Friedl and Farmer (2013), the
intertemporal equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a two-dimensional system,
which represents the law of motion of the resource stock, Et, and the extraction, Xt.
Using the equipment technology (12), the condition (13), the budget constraints
9Choosing the optimal resource stock (equation 15), the maximum profit that the represen-
tative firm can obtain is given by
pi∗t = P
K
t Kt − θPKt BθtXθ−1t I1−θt−1Xt = (1− θ)PKt Kt.
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and first-order conditions (2)-(5) of the households’ problem, and the first-order
conditions (10) of the firms’ maximization problem, we obtain the equation below
for kt+1:
k
1
1−θ
t+1 = B
θ
1−θ
t+1 x
θ
1−θ
t+1
[
σ(1− α) + θα(1− et
xt
)
]
yt, (17)
with σ ≡ β/(1 + β). In addition, taking equations (5), (6), (9), (15) and (16), the
following difference equation for kt+1 arises:
Πk
1
1−θ
t+1 xt
ytxt+1
= α(1− θ)B
θ
1−θ
t+1 x
θ
1−θ
t+1 . (18)
Substituting for kt+1 in the above equations yields (19) below, which describes
the dynamics of resource extraction. Since it also depends on the resource stock
et, we rewrite (1), the law of motion of the natural resource, as (20).
xt+1 = Π
(
β
(1+β)
(1− α) + αθ
α(1− θ)
)
xt − Πθ
(1− θ)et, (19)
et+1 = Π(et − xt). (20)
The linear planar system (19) and (20) describes the dynamics of our economy,
which can be rewritten in matrix form as[
xt+1
et+1
]
=
[
ψ1 ψ2
ψ3 ψ4
][
xt
et
]
≡ Ψ
[
xt
et
]
with ψ1 ≡ Π
(1− θ)
β
(1 + β)
(1− α)
α
+
Πθ
(1− θ) ,
ψ2 ≡ − Πθ
(1− θ) ,
ψ3 ≡ −Π,
ψ4 ≡ Π.
Lemma 1 (steady-states) The steady-state equilibria (x∗, e∗) of our economy are
characterized by the following equations:
x∗ = ψ1x∗ + ψ2e∗, (21)
e∗ = ψ3x∗ + ψ4e∗. (22)
These equations have two sets of steady-states:
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(i) If {ψ1 = 1} or {ψ1 6= 1 and ψ4 = 1} or {ψ1 6= 1, ψ4 6= 1 and (1− ψ4) 6=
ψ2ψ3
(1−ψ1)} there is a unique steady-state (x∗, e∗) = (0, 0) .
(ii) If {ψ1 6= 1, ψ4 6= 1 and (1− ψ4) = ψ2ψ3(1−ψ1)} there is a continuum of steady-
states such that x∗ = ψ2
1−ψ1 e
∗.
Proof. A steady-state (x∗, e∗) in this economy is a fixed point of (19) and (20),
where xt+1 = xt = x
∗ and et+1 = et = e∗. Since Π ≥ 1, ψ1, ψ4 > 0, and ψ2, ψ3 < 0,
the sets (i) and (ii) are easily determined from (21) and (22)
From the linear system (21) and (22), one can verify that there is either a unique
steady-state (x∗, e∗) = (0, 0), or a continuum of them where natural resources are
not necessarily drained. If resources are non-renewable (Π = 1) the only possible
steady-state, without technical progress, is (x∗, e∗) = (0, 0) because ψ4 = 1 (set i).
However, the natural replenishing property of renewable resources (Π > 1, thus,
ψ4 6= 1) allows the economy to avoid depletion (set ii).
3.1 Stability and exhaustible resources
As pointed out in the introduction, the objective of this work is to study the
dynamic implications of the energy intensity assumptions of the economy. In par-
ticular, our intention is to provide an alternative explanation for the non-classical
behavior of exhaustible resources, which was empirically identified in the liter-
ature. Even if Section 2 offers a general framework for both exhaustible and
renewable resources, from now on, we will concentrate on non-renewable resources
and the dynamics around the corresponding unique steady-state (x∗, e∗) = (0, 0).
We analyze below the stability of the system, the occurrence of indeterminacy and
bifurcations, and the subsequent possibility of non-monotone convergence. In this
regard, we find out that the share of energy in the equipment production plays a
fundamental role, together with the discount rate and the share of physical capital
in the final good production. Notice finally that our conclusions will be global
12
since the dynamics of the economy are described by a linear system.10
We denote by λ1 and λ2 the eigenvalues of Ψ in the matrix form of the dynam-
ical system (19) and (20). Let us define β˜ ≡ β
(1+β)
(1−α)
α
> 0. The next proposition
fully describes the dynamics of our economy by means of studying λ1 and λ2. In
particular, we identify cases where complex dynamics arise, allowing the economy
to reproduce the non-classical response described before. These conditions are in-
deed deeply related to the assumption of considering that the equipment sector is
more energy intensive than the final good production.
Proposition 1 (stability) For non-renewable resources and different parameter
combinations, the stability of the zero steady-state changes such that:
1. For 1
2
≤ θ < 1, the dynamics are non-complex and the eigenvalues are on
the different side of one (λ1 > 1 and 0 < λ2 < 1) so that the steady-state is
a saddle.
2. For 0 < θ < 1
2
and 2(1 − 2θ) ≤ β˜, the dynamics are non-complex and the
eigenvalues are on the different side of one (λ1 > 1 and 0 < λ2 < 1) so that
the steady-state is a saddle.
3. For 1
4
≤ θ < 1
2
and β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ), the dynamics are non-complex and the
eigenvalues are on the different side of one (λ1 > 1 and 0 < λ2 < 1) so that
the steady-state is a saddle.
4. For 0 < θ < 1
4
, β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ) and β˜ + 1
β˜
> 2(1 − 2θ), the dynamics are
non-complex and the eigenvalues are on the different side of one (λ1 > 1 and
0 < λ2 < 1) so that the steady-state is a saddle.
5. For 0 < θ < 1
4
and β˜ + 1
β˜
< 2(1− 2θ) the dynamics are complex:
10The results of this paper correspond to global dynamics: they are valid regardless how far
away the economy is from the steady-state. Therefore, in contrast to linearization and local
dynamics, we provide a more general outcome.
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(a) If θ < 1− β˜ both eigenvalues (in absolute value) are smaller than one,
so indeterminacy occurs and the steady-state is stable.
(b) If θ > 1 − β˜ both eigenvalues (in absolute value) are greater than one,
so the equilibrium dynamics are monotone unstable.
Proof. For exhaustible resources Π = 1. If (1 + ψ1)
2 ≥ 4(ψ1 + ψ2) the two
eigenvalues of Ψ are real and given by λ1,2 =
(1+ψ1)
2
± 1
2
√
(1 + ψ1)2 − 4(ψ1 + ψ2).
Moreover, λ1,2 > 0 since the det(Ψ) > 0 and Tr(Ψ) > 1.
11 This implies that non-
monotonic dynamics is only possible if the eigenvalues are complex: if (1 +ψ1)
2 <
4(ψ1 + ψ2), λ1,2 =
(1+ψ1)
2
± i1
2
√
4(ψ1 + ψ2)− (1 + ψ1)2. We identify the cases of
complex dynamics in the Appendix. Let us directly consider the stability analysis:
1. For 1
2
≤ θ < 1, the dynamics are non-complex as the discriminant ∆ ≡ (1 +
ψ1)
2− 4(ψ1 +ψ2) > 0 (see Claim 2 in Appendix). Since λ1,2 > 0, comparing
λ1 and λ2 with 1, one can observe that the dynamics are stable iff both
eigenvalues are smaller than one. This is equivalent to (1+ψ1)
2
< 1−
√
∆
2
. This
is however impossible because (1+ψ1)
2
> 1 −
√
∆
2
(see Claim 3 in Appendix).
Therefore, stability cannot occur.
Let us study the possibility of saddle equilibrium or monotone unstable dy-
namics. The steady-state is saddle iff the two eigenvalues are on the different
side of one. As λ1,2 > 0, this condition is equivalent to λ1 > 1 and λ2 < 1
(notice that, from Claim 1, λ1 > λ2). Taking the expression of λ1,2, the
condition reduces to 1 −
√
∆
2
< (1+ψ1)
2
< 1 +
√
∆
2
. In contrast to that, the
equilibrium dynamics are monotone unstable iff λ1 > 1 and λ2 ≥ 1. This
is equivalent to check that (1+ψ1)
2
≥ 1 +
√
∆
2
. Since the dynamics are non-
complex for 1
2
≤ θ < 1, we can conclude from Claim 3 that (1+ψ1)
2
< 1 +
√
∆
2
.
We have also proved in Claim 3 that (1+ψ1)
2
> 1−
√
∆
2
. Therefore, 1−
√
∆
2
<
(1+ψ1)
2
< 1 +
√
∆
2
and, consequently, the steady-state is a saddle.
11Notice that, λ1λ2 = det(Ψ) = ψ1 + ψ2 > 0. Since det(Ψ) > 0, λ1,2 6= 0 and their sign
coincide. Moreover, λ1 + λ2 = Tr(Ψ) = 1 +ψ1 > 1. We can then conclude that both eigenvalues
are strictly positive.
14
2. For 0 < θ < 1
2
and β˜ ≥ 2(1− 2θ) the dynamics are non-complex (Claim 2).
Therefore, from Claim 3, (1+ψ1)
2
< 1 +
√
∆
2
. From the same claim we also
know that, if 0 < θ < 1
2
and β˜ ≥ 2(1 − 2θ), (1+ψ1)
2
> 1 −
√
∆
2
. We can then
conclude that 1−
√
∆
2
< (1+ψ1)
2
< 1 +
√
∆
2
, thus the steady-state is a saddle.
3. We know from Claim 3 that, if 1
4
≤ θ < 1
2
and β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ), 1 −
√
∆
2
<
(1+ψ1)
2
. Moreover, (1+ψ1)
2
< 1 +
√
∆
2
because we are in a case on non-complex
dynamics (see Claim 3). Therefore, as above, the steady-state is a saddle.
4. It is easy to very that statements 5 and 6 in Claim 3 are also valid for
0 < θ < 1
4
and β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ) if the dynamics are non-complex. Following
Claim 2, we are in a case of non-complex dynamics. We can then conclude
that 1−
√
∆
2
< (1+ψ1)
2
< 1 +
√
∆
2
, thus the steady-state is a saddle.
5. From Claim 2, we know that this is the case of complex dynamics. Taking the
formulas for λ1,2 above, one can verify that |λ1| = |λ2| =
√
β˜
(1−θ) . Comparing
|λ1| = |λ2| with 1, we can directly conclude that the dynamics are stable iff
the modulus of both eigenvalues is smaller than one. This condition is in
fact equivalent to β˜ < (1 − θ). Similarly, the dynamics are unstable iff
the modulus of both eigenvalues is larger than one, which corresponds to
β˜ > (1− θ).
The proposition clearly shows that energy intensity differences among economic
sectors has important dynamic implications. In contrast to the standard approach,
where a monotone converge of resource stock and extraction is predicted, our econ-
omy can also exhibit complex dynamics. This outcome is deeply related to the
assumption that the equipment sector is more energy intensive than the final good
production. Our property of non-monotone converge actually provides an alterna-
tive explanation to the empirically supported fact of the non-classical behaviour of
exhaustible resources: resource stock and extraction can transitory increase (thus
energy prices can temporally decrease) before converging to the zero steady-state.
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Proposition 1 points out the role played by the share of resources in the ac-
cumulation of physical capital, θ. When the share of energy in the production of
equipment is high (1
2
≤ θ < 1), we get the usual saddle-path dynamics. However,
for a lower share (0 < θ < 1
2
) the economy can reproduce situations of com-
plex dynamics and, in particular, non-monotone convergence. In this respect, two
additional elements become fundamental through the parameter β˜: the share of
physical capital in the final good production (α) on the one hand, and the indi-
viduals’ discount rate (β) on the other. For combinations of (α, β) such that β˜
would be low enough (i.e., lower than 2(1− 2θ)), complex dynamics arise. In this
case, an additional upper-bound for θ appears in order to ensure the stability of
the steady-state. This is statement 5 (a) in the proposition, which corresponds
to the non-classical response of exhaustible resources. Since energy resources are
non-renewable in this economy, the variable stock of resources et in the system
(19)-(20) cannot increase. However, differing from non-complex dynamics, the
extraction of resources (variable xt) can increase during some periods, eventually
converging (asymptotically) to the steady-state. Replacing Yt in (15) by (7), and
Kt by (12) afterwards, we get the usual negative relationship between extraction
and energy prices Qt. Therefore, energy prices can transitory decrease, rising later
on as extraction approaches to the steady-state. This possibility of non-monotonic
convergence is an important property of our framework. It highlights in fact the
influence of the energy intensity assumptions on the dynamic predictions of the
model.
The parameters described above are related to the importance that each gener-
ation gives to energy resources. In particular, they affect the value of the ownership
rights for the natural resources at, which are sold from one generation to the next.
In economies where θ is small (lower than 1/4 in our model), energy resources
are relatively unimportant with respect to the other inputs in the equipment tech-
nology. Therefore, future generations give little value to the ownership rights of
resources. The current generation would then not have many incentives to leave
resources to the next generation, increasing thus the extraction when old. This
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will continue until energy becomes relative scarce. At this moment, the value of
the ownership rights raises, creating new incentives to reduce extraction and, con-
sequently, increasing the amount of resources left to the next generation.12
We should observe that the non-classical behaviour also depends on the share
of equipment in the technology of final good and the discount rate through the pa-
rameter β˜. Proposition 1 (statement 5) identifies boundaries for β˜. The condition
in (a) can be rewritten as β˜ < 1 − θ, providing an upper limit. Moreover, it also
implies that β˜ < 2(1− 2θ) since (1− θ) < 2(1− 2θ) for 0 < θ < 1/4. The second
condition β˜ + 1/β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ) concludes then that β˜ cannot be too small either.
Let us consider a reference economy for 0 < θ < 1/4 where α and β are such the
conditions of statement 5 (a), and so the boundaries for β˜, hold. For a higher
discount rate β, the parameter β˜ will increase and, therefore, the upper limit may
not be respected anymore.13 However, this effect can be counterbalanced if the
economy has a higher share of physical capital in the technology of final goods (α).
The interpretation is the following. A higher discount rate implies greater concern
of consumers for their old age and, consequently, for the amount of resources they
are going to extract or leave (sell) to the next generation. Since energy is not
very important in this economy (0 < θ < 1/4), the next generation will not value
so much the ownership rights. Therefore, as above, the current generation may
increase the resource extraction for some periods. Nevertheless, a larger share of
equipment in final good technology would increase how much future generations
value energy resources and the corresponding ownership rights, ensuring then that
extraction will eventually decreases.
Notice finally that the upper bound for β˜ allow us to identify limit cycles. We
show in the next corollary that the critical value (1−θ) reveals indeed the existence
of a hopf-type bifurcation. Hopf cycles appear when a steady-state loses or gains
stability due to a change in a parameter, and meanwhile a cycle either emerges
12Since consumers are non-altruistic and live for two periods, ownership rights prevent the old
generation from extracting all resources.
13From the definition of β˜, it is easy to see that ∂β˜/∂β > 0 and ∂β˜/∂α < 0.
17
from or collapses into the steady-state (for further details, see among others, Asea
and Zak, 1999; Kind, 1999; and Yu¨ksel, 2011).
Corollary 1 (hopf bifurcation) Assume that 0 < θ < 1
4
and β˜ + 1
β˜
< 2(1 − 2θ).
Indeterminacy occurs for β˜ < 1 − θ; a hopf bifurcation arises for β˜ = 1 − θ; and
the steady-state is unstable for β˜ > 1− θ.
For small values of the share of energy in the equipment production, depending
on its interaction with the capital share in the final good technology and the
discount rate, the equilibrium trajectories could be indeterminate, implying the
possibility of multiple equilibria (see Benhabib and Gali, 1995, for a survey). If
β˜ < 1− θ, in contrast to saddle stability, there would be multiple paths tending to
the (unique) steady-state since many values of x0 ≥ 0 would be compatible with
this equilibrium. Moreover, as showed before, the convergence in this case will be
non-monotonic. If β˜ > 1−θ cycles arise, but the economy will not converge to the
steady-state. These unstable dynamics can be interpreted considering again the
importance that each generation gives to energy resources. Assume an economy
with (α, β) such that it converges, non-monotonically, to the steady-state. If we
sufficiently increase β and reduce α, the subsequent larger β˜ may induce cycles
that will not converge to the steady-state (if β˜ is greater than 1 − θ). As before,
a greater discount rate (β) implies that generations are more concerned about
their old age and, therefore, about how much they will extract or leave to the
next generation. If at the same time the importance of equipment input in the
final good production (α) lowers, energy would not be central either. Therefore,
the next generation will not value natural resources much, reducing the incentives
of the old generation to replace extraction by ownership rights. Let us lastly
mention that since resources are non-renewable in this paper, the non-monotonic
trajectories corresponding to β˜ ≥ 1 − θ will end up in the steady-state but in
a finite time, i.e., non-asymptotically. Because the quantity of resources cannot
increase, the current stock et is an upper-limit to how much the economy can
extract in that period. Since the stock of resources always shrinks with extraction,
the economy will completely deplete the resources in a finite time if β˜ ≥ 1 − θ.
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The zero steady-state then emerges, but as a corner solution.14
4 Concluding remarks
Although the literature widely assumes the same technology for consumption
and capital accumulation sector, data suggest that physical capital production
is relatively more energy-intensive than consumption and, thus, the usage of non-
renewable resources can limit growth through the equipment production. Using an
overlapping generations (OLG) natural resources model, we examine the dynamic
implications of differentiating the energy intensities of physical capital sector and
final good production. The model assumes that the equipment sector is more en-
ergy intensive than consumption, where energy is obtained from the extraction of
natural resources. In contrast to the standard approach, we model the accumula-
tion of physical capital to be determined not only by the savings but also by the
energy that it requires.
We find that the introduction of energy-intensity differentiation among sectors
has important implications for the standard results in the area. Richer dynamics
other than saddle arise. In particular, energy extraction and prices can follow a
non-monotonic trend that is consistent with the empirical finding about the non-
classical behaviour of exhaustible resources. From an economic policy perspective,
we believe that this paper provides a meaningful contribution too. On the one
hand, we have identified a new component that improves our understanding about
the puzzling issue of non-monotonic response of exhaustible resources. Our work
makes compatible the theoretical predictions with the empirics in this regard. On
the other hand, since proper policymaking depends on economic forecasts, “appro-
priately modeling the nature of the time series can be invaluable to forecasters”
(Lee et al., 2006). In this line, a general message of our paper is that the assump-
tions about the energy-intensity differences among sectors should be taken with
14Notice that stable (unstable) cycles can be sustained, for β˜ = (>)1 − θ, if the stock of
resources were not subject to the positivity constrain et ≥ 0.
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caution in the design of economic policies.
Several issues can be considered in future research. As pointed out before,
our framework can be also applied to renewable resources by considering Π > 1.
This would potentially create even richer dynamics. In particular, convergence
to steady-states without exhaustibility may be possible since resources naturally
reproduce. Extraction, moreover, would not necessarily induce lower future stock
of resources. This could allow then, in contrast to the corner solutions observed
before, the emergence of the long-run cycles. Following the same direction, another
interesting hypothesis to examine is the role played by the regeneration law of nat-
ural resources. One could indeed consider alternative regeneration specifications
to the usual linear replenishing of resources. In this respect, a logistic reproduction
law has been often recommended to study forestry problems (Farmer, 2000; and
Bednar-Friedl and Farmer, 2013, among others).
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Claim 1 For non-renewable resources, the discriminant ∆ ≡ (1+ψ1)2−4(ψ1+ψ2)
cannot be zero. In fact,
∆ > (<)0⇔ 2 (1− 2θ)− β˜ < (>) 1
β˜
. (23)
Moreover, for real eigenvalues, λ1 > λ2.
Proof. Let us prove that ∆ 6= 0. By contradiction, we assume that ∆ = 0.
Therefore (1 + ψ1)
2 = 4(ψ1 + ψ2). Since ψ1 =
β˜+θ
1−θ and ψ2 = − θ(1−θ) , the pre-
vious condition is equivalent to
(
1+β˜
1−θ
)2
= 4β˜
1−θ . This is only possible iff β˜ =
(1− 2θ) ±
√
(1− 2θ)2 − 1. Since (1− 2θ)2 < 1, β˜ would be a complex number.
This contradicts however our definition of β˜, which is a real number. We indeed
conclude that ∆ > (<)0 iff 2 (1− 2θ)− β˜ < (>) 1
β˜
. Finally, from the expression of
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the real eigenvalues, we can directly observe that λ1 > λ2 since ψ1 > 0 and ∆ 6= 0
Claim 2 Whether the dynamics are complex or not depends on the following pa-
rameter combinations:
1. For 1
2
≤ θ < 1 or {0 < θ < 1
2
and β˜ > 2(1 − 2θ)} the dynamics are
non-complex.
2. For 1
4
≤ θ < 1
2
and β˜ < 2(1− 2θ) the dynamics are non-complex.
3. For 0 < θ < 1
4
and β˜ + 1
β˜
> 2(1− 2θ) the dynamics are non-complex.
4. For 0 < θ < 1
4
and β˜ + 1
β˜
< 2(1− 2θ) the dynamics are complex.
Proof. The dynamics are (non-)complex iff ∆(>) < 0.
1. For 1
2
≤ θ < 1 or {0 < θ < 1
2
and β˜ > 2(1 − 2θ)}, it is easy to verify that
2 (1− 2θ)− β˜ < 1
β˜
since β˜ > 0. Therefore, from Claim 1, ∆ > 0.
2. By contradiction. Let us assume, for 1
4
≤ θ < 1
2
and β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ), that
∆ < 0. Claim 1 would then imply that 2 (1− 2θ) > 1
β˜
+β˜. Therefore, since all
terms are non-negative, we conclude that 2 (1− 2θ) > 1
β˜
and 2 (1− 2θ) > β˜.
This can be rewritten as 2 (1− 2θ) > β˜ > 1
2(1−2θ) . The condition holds iff
4 (1− 2θ)2 > 1. This reduces to 2 (1− 2θ) > 1 since (1− 2θ) > 0. Hence
θ < 1
4
, which contradicts our initial assumption on θ.
3. It follows from equation (23).
4. It follows from equation (23).
Finally notice that the case β˜ + 1
β˜
= 2(1 − 2θ) is not possible since ∆ 6= 0 (see
Claim 1)
Claim 3 Considering the definition of ∆ in Claim 1, we can establish the following
results:
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1. If 1
2
≤ θ < 1 then 1−
√
∆
2
< 0.
2. For non-complex dynamics, 1 +
√
∆
2
> (1+ψ1)
2
.
3. If 1
2
≤ θ < 1 then (1+ψ1)
2
> 1−
√
∆
2
.
4. If 0 < θ < 1
2
and β˜ > 2(1− 2θ) then (1+ψ1)
2
> 1−
√
∆
2
.
5. If 1
4
≤ θ < 1
2
and β˜ < 2(1− 2θ) then 1−
√
∆
2
> 0.
6. If 1
4
≤ θ < 1
2
and β˜ < 2(1− 2θ) then (1+ψ1)
2
> 1−
√
∆
2
.
Proof.
1. Let us first show that 1 −
√
∆
2
6= 0. Suppose the contrary, 1 =
√
∆
2
. Then
β˜ = (1−2θ)±2√2θ2 − 3θ + 1. For θ = 1/2, β˜ = 0 and we find a contradiction
because β˜ > 0. Let us study 1/2 < θ < 1. It can be verified that in this
case 2θ2 − 3θ + 1 6= 0: 2θ2 − 3θ + 1 = 0 for θ = 0 or θ = 1/2. We can
actually proof that 2θ2 − 3θ + 1 < 0: assuming that 2θ2 − 3θ + 1 > 0,
3 < 1
θ
+ 2θ; however, for 1/2 < θ < 1, it is easy to check that 3 > 1
θ
+ 2θ.
Nevertheless, this result implies that β˜ is complex, which is a contradiction
and, consequently, 1−
√
∆
2
6= 0. In fact, we can show that 1 −
√
∆
2
< 0. Let
us assume the contrary, 1−
√
∆
2
> 0. This would imply that 4(1− θ)2 − 1 >
β˜
[
β˜ − 2(1− 2θ)
]
. However, for 1
2
≤ θ < 1, the RHS> 0 while LHS< 0. So
we get a contradiction.
2. By contradiction. Let us assume 1 +
√
∆
2
≤ (1+ψ1)
2
. This is equivalent to
(ψ1 − 1)2 ≥ ∆(> 0). Since ∆ = (1+ψ1)2−4(ψ1 +ψ2), the previous condition
would imply that 0 ≥ −4ψ2. But this is impossible because ψ2 < 0.
3. From statement 1 of this claim, we already know that 1−
√
∆
2
< 0 if 1
2
≤ θ < 1.
Our result is then verified since ψ1 > 0.
4. Let us consider, by contradiction, that (1+ψ1)
2
≤ 1 −
√
∆
2
. This would imply
that ψ1 − 1 ≤ −
√
∆. We know that ψ1 − 1 = β˜−(1−2θ)1−θ , which is strictly
positive since β˜ ≥ 2(1 − 2θ) > (1 − 2θ) > 0. We then get a contradiction
since −√∆ < 0.
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5. Let us first show that 1−
√
∆
2
6= 0. Suppose the contrary, 1 =
√
∆
2
. Then, β˜ =
(1−2θ)±2√2θ2 − 3θ + 1. For 1
4
≤ θ < 1
2
, one can verify that 2θ2−3θ+1 > 0
and (1 − 2θ) > 0. We can show that β˜ = (1 − 2θ) + 2√2θ2 − 3θ + 1 is
impossible: let us rewrite β˜ = (1 − 2θ) +√(1− 2θ)2 + [4(1− θ)2 − 1]; it is
easy to check that 0 < β˜ < 2(1− 2θ) < (1− 2θ) +√(1− 2θ)2 + a for a > 0;
recalling a = 4(1 − θ)2 − 1, since 4(1 − θ)2 − 1 > 0 for 0 < θ < 1/2, the
previous expression provides the contradiction β˜ < β˜. Similarly, β˜ = (1 −
2θ)− 2√2θ2 − 3θ + 1 cannot hold either: since β˜ > 0, this would imply that
(1−2θ) >√(1− 2θ)2 + [4(1− θ)2 − 1]; however, (1−2θ) <√(1− 2θ)2 + a
for a > 0; as above, recalling a = 4(1− θ)2− 1(> 0) gives us a contradiction.
We know now that 1 −
√
∆
2
6= 0. In order to show that 1 −
√
∆
2
> 0, let us
assume 1−
√
∆
2
< 0. This would imply that β˜[β˜− 2(1− 2θ)] > 4(1− θ)2− 1.
But this is not possible since the LHS< 0 and the RHS> 0.
6. By contradiction. We assume (1+ψ1)
2
≤ 1−
√
∆
2
, which would imply (ψ1−1) ≤
−√∆. On the one hand, −√∆ < 0 because we are in a situation of non-
complex dynamics. On the other hand, (ψ1 − 1) = β˜−(1−2θ)1−θ , where we can
identify two cases for β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ): (i) (1 − 2θ) ≤ β˜ < 2(1 − 2θ) and (ii)
β˜ < (1− 2θ) < 2(1− 2θ). Case (i) yields a contradiction since (ψ1 − 1) > 0.
Case (ii) would imply (ψ1 − 1)2 ≥ ∆, which is impossible for non-complex
dynamics (see proof of Claim 3, statement 2).
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